Abstract-We evaluate the role skin color plays in earnings and employment for black males in the NLSY97. By applying a novel, scaled measure of skin tone to a nationally representative sample and by estimating the evolution of labor market differentials over time, we bridge a burgeoning literature on skin color with more established literatures on wage differentials and labor market discrimination. We find that while intraracial wage gaps widen with experience, gaps between the lightest-skinned black workers and whites remain constant, suggesting that a blurring of the color line elicits subtle yet meaningful variation in earnings differentials over time.
the relationship between labor market outcomes and the most salient indicator of race in the United States: skin tone.
To accomplish this, we employ novel data on skin tone collected as part of this project in the 2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY97). While this is not the first study to examine the relationship between skin color and labor market outcomes (see Hersch, 2006 Hersch, , 2008 Hughes & Hertel, 1990; Goldsmith & Darity, 2007) , we present three significant advantages over previous efforts: first, we make use of a common, standardized visual measure of skin tone used by all interviewers; second, we apply this measure to a nationally representative sample of early-career black and white males with detailed records of background characteristics, skill accumulation, and labor market outcomes; third, we exploit the panel nature of our data to observe the evolution of wage gaps over the early careers of these respondents.
Our empirical specifications examine the salience of gaps in wages and employment across skin color for black respondents that cannot be explained away by differences in background characteristics or observable measures of productivity. By nesting skin color within race, allowing us to compare inter-with intra-racial gaps in labor market outcomes, we are able to interpret our results regarding complexion differentials with respect to the more developed literature on racial inequality.
We begin, following a tradition initiated with Neal and Johnson (1996) , by including measures of skills accumulated before individuals become active in the labor market and observing the residual differences in employment and wages that emerge during the interaction between suppliers and demanders of labor. We build on these results, following Oettinger (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) , by interacting race and skin color with measures of labor market experience, allowing us to view the evolution of wage disparities as workers accumulate skill and match quality is revealed.
We find that while the lightest third of the black complexion distribution earn more than the median group, there is no skin color differential between the median and darkest terciles, suggesting a negative, nonlinear relationship between skin color darkness and wages for black men. While controlling for a host of background characteristics, childhood circumstances, education, and a measure of skill reduces the 2 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS black-white gap by nearly half, these controls have smaller effects on the intraracial light-dark gap. Turning our analysis to employment, we find virtually no difference in the share of weeks employed across skin color despite significant differences across race. Finally, longitudinal exercises indicate that the skin color gap widens as respondents accrue labor market experience. These results suggest that viewing racial disparities in stark black and white ignores subtle differences that emerge within race, which Alba (2009) calls "a blurring of the color line."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes theories of labor market discrimination and previous research on skin color. Section III describes the NLSY97 sample, our measure of skin color, and the relationship between skin color ratings and interviewer characteristics. Section IV describes our empirical strategy and relates it to previous work. In section V, we discuss results and assess the robustness of our findings. Conclusions and suggestions for future research are laid out in section VI.
II. Background

A. Theories of Black-White Labor Market Differentials
Two prominent economic theories have been advanced for the existence of racial gaps in wage offers. 2 The first, termed taste-based prejudice, is attributable to Becker (1971) . In this view, prejudiced employers gain disutility from interacting with minority workers and thus offer lower wages for comparable work. In this scenario, prejudiced employers and minority workers sort away from one another in the labor market. Wage differentials between minority and nonminority workers of the same skill and experience arise when minority workers are unable to find employment with nonprejudiced employers. The likelihood of this occurring is increasing in both the minority share of the labor force and the share of employers that are prejudiced. In the case that sorting is not possible, the level of prejudice of the marginal discriminator determines the wage gap. Black (1995) builds on this literature by adding search frictions, arguing that even when only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers, minority wages decline when any employer in the market discriminates. Charles and Guryan (2008) test Becker's theory by combining regional measures of racial attitudes with estimates of the size of the black labor force, finding that black-white wage inequality increases with both black labor supply and white racial distaste, as the theory predicts.
A second hypothesis suggests that employers are faced with incomplete information about potential employees. In this case, employers base decisions on the average characteristics of the group to which potential employees belong. Of course, this reasoning is not restricted to race and can be applied equally to gender, age, sexual orientation, or any other feature. Such ignorance or limited information generates what is referred to as statistical discrimination in the 2 See Lang and Lehmann (2012) for a full discussion.
literature (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Phelps, 1972) . Empirical research on this version is more robust and largely relies on the analysis of employers' learning about actual productivity as workers accumulate experience or tenure in combination with labor market search models.
In this spirit, Oettinger (1996) proposes a two-period model where black and white workers have identical average productivity, but employers and employees observe only a noisy ex ante signal of match quality. After the first period, true productivity is realized, and workers either choose to stay, and earn the wage associated with their realized match, or leave and draw again from the distribution of employers. The key assumption here, a hallmark of the statistical discrimination literature, is that the signal of match quality is less precise for black workers. Thus, sorting is more difficult and unproductive job changes are more likely. From this, the author's model yields four key predictions: (a) that the blackwhite wage gap will be 0 at entry, (b) that a gap emerges at high levels of experience, (c) that blacks have smaller returns to experience, and (d) that blacks have larger returns to tenure. 3 Testing these predictions using the NLSY79, the author confirms the first three hypotheses but fails to find evidence of the fourth. We conduct similar tests with respect to both race and skin color in our empirical exercises.
In a similar vein, Altonji and Pierret (2001) argue that observable measures of skill should decrease in importance as employers learn about employees' productivity, while the importance of productivity measures observable only to the econometrician should increase over time. Accordingly, if employers use race as a source of information, adding interactions between experience and skill measures unobservable to the former should lead to a more positive coefficient on the interaction term between race and experience and should increase the main effect of race. Conversely, if employers do not, or only partially, use race as a source of information, then the race gap should be small when experience is 0, should widen over time if race is negatively correlated with the unobserved productivity measure, and controlling for unobservable productivity should decrease the race gap in experience. The authors confirm that the importance of productivity measures observable at the time of hire decreases over time and that the importance of measures unobservable at the time of hire increases. Apposite to our case, they conclude that there is little evidence that firms statistically discriminate on the basis of race.
Several studies look at specific traits associated with race for blacks and whites that employers might use to elicit information about potential productivity. For example, Grogger (2011) finds that black NLSY97 respondents who were more consistently identified as black using a minimal amount of speech by a group of listeners earned less than those not consistently identified as black. In an audit study, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find that fictional résumés with "white" names received nearly 50% more callbacks than those with "black"-sounding names. In response, Fryer and Levitt (2004) find that for blacks born in the 1980s and 1990s, distinctively black names are not negatively correlated with later life outcomes once childhood circumstances are accounted for.
A separate literature estimates labor market differentials between black and white workers by observing residual differences in employment or earnings after accounting for measures of education, skill, experience, and background characteristics. We draw specific attention to seminal work by Neal and Johnson (1996) , who conduct these exercises with respect to wages, and to Ritter and Taylor (2011) , who conduct similar exercises with employment. While our data do not allow us to clearly distinguish between the theories we have described, we conduct similar empirical exercises allowing us to frame our results within the existing literature while bridging this work with a burgeoning literature on differentials within race and across skin color as described below.
B. Skin Color in Previous Literature
While few data sets contain information on the skin color of Americans, a small number of specialized studies have sustained research on the topic with mixed results. 4 The National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA) collected information on three generations of 2,107 adults between 1978 and 1980. Skin color in the sample was collected from nonstandardized interviewer perceptions on a Likert scale with five categories: (1) very dark brown, (2) dark brown, (3) medium brown, (4) light brown/light skinned, and (5) very light brown/very light skinned. Using these surveys, Hughes and Hertel (1990) indicate that, conditional on parents' socioeconomic status, lighter blacks were more likely to hold more prestigious occupations than their darker peers. 5 Goldsmith and Darity (2007) revisit the same data comparing two definitions of race: the first, coined "the one-drop rule," in which only race matters, and the second "the rainbow rule," in which complexion matters. They find that even after controlling for demographic characteristics, education, and workplace characteristics, the average African American earns over 16 percentage points less per hour than a lighter-complexioned peer.
Similarly, using the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (1992) (1993) (1994) , administered to approximately 8,500 households in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, also using a Likert scale to classify skin color (light, medium, and dark), the same authors find that wages decline with darkness of complexion. Hersch (2006) also explores these data to discuss differences in labor market outcomes according to skin color, but her findings indicate that among males, wage gaps are seemingly unrelated to variation in complexion. More recently, Akee and Yuksel (2010) used the Coronary Artery Risk in Young Adults study (CARDIA), which is the richest example regarding the objective collection of skin color measures based on readings from a reflectance spectrometer, finding that the salience of skin tone for employment has decreased for women over time but not for men. 6 Finally, the New Immigrant Survey (NIS, 2003) collected information on the skin color of recent legal immigrants to the United States using the same eleven-point scale applied to respondents of the NLSY97 who are the focus of this paper. Hersch (2008) analyzed these data and found significant labor market differentials across skin color for immigrants of all races. We note that skin color for immigrants may play a different role in labor market outcomes than it does for African Americans.
III. Data: The NLSY97
The National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) 1997 cohort is administered annually to a nationally representative sample born between 1981 and 1985. Initial rounds were designed to provide a detailed description of each respondent's home environment and behaviors, with a strong focus on human capital accumulation, school-to-work transitions, and subsequent labor market outcomes.
In 2006 a proposal for the inclusion of skin color was submitted by one of the authors to the NLSY's Principal Investigators and to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the government agency responsible for the NLSY surveys. The scale was adopted for the 2008 wave of data collection (round 13); fieldwork was facilitated by the fact that the institution commissioned, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), also conducted interviews for the New Immigrant Survey, for which the original skin color scale was drawn five years earlier.
The scale ranges from 0 (lightest) to 10 (darkest) and presents color images of human hands with identical forms but different skin tonalities; a facsimile version of the scale can be seen in figure 1. 7 Interviewers are instructed to review or memorize the scale before the interview in order to rate respondents without presenting the card directly. Of the 3,455 black and white male respondents in the NLSY survey, 2,837 were interviewed in 2008. Of these respondents, 2,417 4 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS received a skin color rating in 2008; the majority of those not rated were interviewed by phone. Although 95 nonrated respondents received skin color ratings in 2009 or 2010, we omit these respondents from our primary analysis as interviewer effects are arguably different across waves. 8 Figure 2 shows a histogram of skin color ratings for all 2,417 black and white males who received a skin color rating in 2008. Although the scale is different, the distribution of skin tone across and within race is strikingly similar to that found from using a reflectance spectrometer in the CARDIA study. 9
A. Interviewer Characteristics and Measured Skin Color
In general, information in the NLSY is collected in person. NORC interviewers were largely matched to the demographic majority of the surveyed area in an attempt to maximize response rates. Regarding racial composition, 63% of interviewers were white and 19% were black. Most were women, had some college education, and were above 50 years of age. Column 1 of Table 1 shows means of interviewer characteristics for the 167 interviewers who completed skin color ratings black and white respondents in 2008. Columns 2 to 4 show mean interviewer characteristics weighted by the 2,417 NLSY respondents who received skin color ratings in 2008. Table 2 shows means of skin color ratings by interviewer characteristics for black and white male respondents. While differences across interviewer age and gender are trivial, we find that the average skin color rating of black respondents interviewed by black interviewers (5.9) is more than one unit lower (lighter) than it is for those interviewed by nonblack interviewers (6.8). The former also report skin color with higher variance among blacks than the latter. These simple correlations raise an important issue: despite the use of a standardized skin color measure, skin color gradations may still depend on subjective evaluations correlated with interviewer race or the racial composition of the respondent group that Statistics are means and standard deviations of skin tones by interviewer characteristics (rows) and respondent race (columns). Sample is 2,417 black and white men with skin color ratings in 2008.
interviewers contact in the field. We address this concern by evaluating the reliability of interviewer skin color ratings.
B. Assessing the Reliability of Interviewer Ratings
Ideally we would have several interviewers rate each respondent and conduct interrater reliability tests. In lieu of this, we approximately test the reliability of skin color ratings using siblings. As a thought experiment, imagine that each respondent has only one twin sibling. Now imagine that all siblings who live apart are interviewed by different people, while all siblings living together are interviewed by the same person, and that living apart is an idiosyncratic phenomenon. We could then examine the correlation between ratings by these different interviewers as if we had two measures for the same individual. That is, we would estimate (γ 1 ) in a dyadic linear regression between the skin color of sibling i, as rated by interviewer r, and the skin color of sibling j, as rated by interviewer s:
While this quantity would be ideally suited for an evaluation of classical measurement error, this is unlikely to be our case. If observed skin color is equal to the true color plus some error, and skin color measures are discrete and bounded from above and below, 0 to 10 in our case, then the measurement error is necessarily negatively correlated with the true color value and should be considered nonclassical. Moreover, the truncation of the distribution of errors generates a nonzero correlation between errors of different raters. 10 In other words, for respondent i rated by interviewer r, we observe color r i = color * + ε r i and can rewrite the slope coefficient from equation (2) above as:
. (3) Assuming identical covariance between the error and the true measure, independent of rater, equation (3) simplifies to
. (4) Equation (4) reveals opposing forces. On one hand, a positive relationship between errors by different raters, cov(ε r i , ε s j ) > 0, would overestimate the reliability of our measure. On the other hand, legitimate variation in phenotypes expected within a given family, as predicted by the genetics of skin color determination, cov(color * i , color * j ) < var(color * j ), would move the estimated value of the slope parameter away from unity, even if correlated measurement errors were not an issue. 11 Therefore, we cannot consider the estimated quantity as an exact indicator of the relevance of the measurement error, only as a raw approximation of it.
Despite differences between the ideal experiment and the variation available in our data, we estimate the slope coefficient from a dyadic regression of white, black, or Hispanic pairs of individuals (N = 1,082) and find point estimates between 0.71 and 0.73 that are statistically significant (and different from 1) at conventional levels. These results are robust to taking into consideration that discreteness in the skin color scale generates a nontrivial amount of correct classification between siblings simply by chance. In addition, we computed several traditional measures of reliability using the same sample. 12 Despite the absence of consensus regarding benchmark values, the overall impression is that these numbers indicate a low, yet not extremely low, reliability of our skin color measure. Finally, we investigate whether interviewers are affected by relative reference groups when rating skin color by examining whether the correlation is higher between siblings who coreside and are interviewed by the same interviewer than it is for siblings who live apart and are rated by different interviewers. Correlations are indeed stronger among the former, but we are still able to reproduce equivalent reliability measures between those same-rater and different-rater pairs of siblings once we account for interviewer characteristics using a fixed-effects 6 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS "Entered labor market" indicates if respondent was ever observed after two consecutive nonenrolled terms. "Employment sample" refers to respondents with nonmissing highest grade complete (HGC) and employment history. "Wage sample" refers to respondents with wages in jobs with thirty or more hours per week.
specification. Therefore, if this type of subjectivity is a factor in our estimates, it should be eliminated when interviewer characteristics are controlled for. Table 3 describes the sequence of restrictions used in order to reach our working sample. We restrict our analysis to nonHispanic black and white males, avoiding the modeling of female labor force decisions, which are often substantively different for black and white women. 13 We limit analysis to respondents who have results of the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT scores), a measure of highest grade completed, and who have entered the labor market, defined as the first of four consecutive semesters of nonenrollment. The employment sample is restricted to respondents with labor force participation measures, and the wage sample is restricted to non-self-employed, nonenrolled, nonmilitary jobs with thirty or more hours per week.
C. Analysis Sample
We divide black respondents into terciles of the black skin color distribution, with skin tones 1 to 5 comprising the lightest third and 8 to 10 the darkest. Table 4 shows summary statistics across race and skin tone for black and white respondents in our sample; results for the employment sample are similar. Table 4 reveals subtle differences in AFQT, maternal education, region of residence, and family wealth (measured in 1997) across skin tone within the black community, although they are not statistically different at conventional levels.
IV. Empirical Specification
Our interest is in wage and employment differentials that emerge within race and across skin color that cannot be accounted for by differences in background, experience, or skill. We model this relationship first on the pooled sample and then add interactions with experience to analyze the evolution of inter-and intraracial wage gaps as productivity and match quality are observed. In all specifications, we assume that skin color has no significance for white respondents in the labor market and accordingly set color equal to 0 for whites. 13 See Neal (2006) . The sample is 1,694 respondents in the wage sample. AFQT is a z-score normalized to the working color sample of 2,417. HGC is respondent's highest grade completed. Entry age is age at which respondents first enter the labor market, defined by two consecutive nonenrolled years. South and non-MSA are averaged over individuals. Poverty ratio is for the family, measured in 1997, and is 1 if at the poverty line. Potential experience and tenure are measured in the most recent year in which respondents were interviewed. Wage observations counts the number of observations respondents contribute to the wage regressions.
A. Pooled, Cross-Sectional Analysis
We begin our analysis by pooling observations across waves, estimating versions of
where y itj is either the natural log of real wages or the share of weeks employed thirty or more hours in the past interview year for individual (i) in year (t) rated by interviewer ( j) in 2008. S it includes the highest grade completed at time t and AFQT standardized over black and white men with skin color ratings. The vector X 1,it includes age, MSA status, and region at time t. X 2,i includes age at labor market entry and contains time-invariant measures (as of 1997) of childhood circumstances, including household poverty ratio, if the family ever received government aid, if the respondent lived with both parents at age 6, lived in the South or outside an MSA at age 12, mother's highest grade completed, height and weight, and proxies for behavioral problems constructed using principal component analysis (school suspension, use of alcohol or drugs, characteristics of peers, and participation in illicit acts). These constitute "All individual controls" in regression tables.
In each exercise we present two parameterizations of f (Black i , Color i ) . The first, which we call the blurred color line, divides the black population into terciles of the black skin color distribution. The second, termed the sharp color line, excludes skin tone and compares blacks and whites in the traditional binary sense. Sharp color line: f 2 =β 1 Black f 1 reestimates the blurred color line, replacing the median tercile with a main effect for black, allowing the reader to interpret coefficients on the first and third terciles as relative to the median black respondent. In this case,β 1 = β 1 − β 2 ,β 3 = β 3 −β 2 , and β 2 is identical in f 1 andf 1 . We also show outcomes from a nonparametric specification with dummy indicators for each separate skin tone as part of our robustness checks.
In our preferred specification, we include interviewer fixed effects (η j ) to account for subjective variation in skin color ratings across interviewers. Otherwise, we include controls for interviewer characteristics listed in tables 1 and 2. We follow with a series of robustness checks to test for sensitivity to alternative sample definitions. Since employment shares, defined as the number of weeks employed thirty or more hours since the last interview per total number of weeks since the last interview, are bounded above and below, we estimate a generalized linear model (GLM) using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator based on a logistic transformation, as described in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . This allows us to abstract from the share of weeks employed between interviews from the number of weeks with valid labor market outcomes during that time. 14 To facilitate interpretation of these coefficients, we report marginal effects.
B. Longitudinal Analysis
We extend this analysis to investigate how intraracial wage differentials evolve by including interactions between skin tone and experience as described by
This strategy builds on previous work by Altonji and Pierret (2001) who argue that at time of hire, wages will be strongly correlated with observable measures, such as education, and the relationship between unobservable skill measures, such as AFQT, will be low. Over time, the importance of the former should decrease and the value of latter should increase, evidenced by negative coefficients on interactions between education and experience, and positive coefficients on interactions between experience and AFQT. They proceed to test whether employers elicit information from race until true productivity is revealed. In this case, interactions between black and experience, or dark skin and experience for intraracial comparisons, should be positive despite a negative main effect. Analogously, these specifications approximate exercises in Oettinger (1996) . While Altonji and Pierret (2001) use potential experience to avoid the endogenous nature of tenure or actual experience, Oettinger specifically compares interactions between race and both experience and tenure, predicting a higher return to tenure for blacks and to experience for whites, as described in section II. Translating this to skin tone differentials, we would expect little difference in wages at labor market entry and higher returns to tenure for darkskinned relative to lighter-skinned black respondents and higher returns to experience for light-skinned blacks compared with their darker-skinned peers if skin color is used as a source of information by employers. Accordingly, we model two versions of interactions between skin color and experience. The first interacts race and skin color with potential experience, defined by the number of years since labor market entry. The second adds to this main effect and interactions with job-specific tenure, allowing us to interpret results with respect to the literature.
V. Results
A. Wages
Our main specification, table 5, shows the impact of various controls on inter-and intraracial wage gaps, as described in equation (5). We begin with raw differences in column 1, controlling only for year effects, and find that accounting for educational attainment and AFQT in column 2 reduces the sharp black-white gap (panel B) by roughly one-third, from 21.5 to 13.7 log points, and reduces the intrarace lightmedian gap by one-quarter, from 8 to 6.3 percentage points (panel C), and has no discernible effect on the medium-dark gap, which remains statistically indistinguishable from 0. The results for each complexion group relative to whites are in panel A.
Column 3 replaces S it (AFQT and education) with a host of background controls accounting for individual characteristics, geography, and childhood circumstances. Comparatively, these controls account for a larger share of the black-white wage gap-nearly one-half-than do controls for education and AFQT. The effect of controlling for background characteristics on the light-dark gap is relatively similar to controlling for only education and premarket skills. This implies larger differences in black-white background characteristics correlated with wages than skill accumulation, particularly in the case of lighter blacks. Column 4 includes both sets of controls, which explain a larger share of the interracial gap in wages. Intraracial gaps remain less sensitive to the addition of covariates.
Columns 5 and 6 add interviewer characteristics and interviewer fixed effects, respectively. Our preferred specification, The dependent variable is log real hourly wage; specification is from equation (5). Sample is respondents who have entered the labor market, with nonmissing HGC and AFQT, and valid wages (30 or more hours/week). Controls include region, MSA, childhood circumstances, and controls for personal behaviors. Coefficients in panels A and B are relative to white. In panel C, coefficients are relative to medium black. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
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* p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
in column 6, reduces the black-white wage gap by approximately half, from 21.5 to 11.7 percentage points. These estimates are in line with recent literature, highlighting the fact that differences in premarket skills and background characteristics explain a significant share of observed wage disparities. 15 In contrast with the effect on interracial wage gaps (panel B), the inclusion of subsequent controls on intraracial wage gaps (panel C) has little impact, leading us to conclude that controls for background, demographics, skill, and education explain a larger share of the interrace wage gap (roughly one-half) than they do the intrarace gap (one-third) in the most conservative estimate. 16 Importantly, we are not in a position to rule out that the accumulation of skill is itself a response to expected labor market discrimination (see Coate & Loury, 1993) or that our skill measures are racially or color biased or incomplete in nature (see Goldsmith and Darity, 1997; Darity & Mason, 1998) .
B. Sensitivity Analysis
In See Black, Haviland, and Taylor (2008) , Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2009), Carneiro and Masterov (2005) , and Lang and Manove (2011) . 16 In an earlier version, we also explored an alternative estimation based on identification via heteroskedasticity of measurement errors. The results confirmed findings presented here. largely robust to these changes, with two exceptions. First, restricting the sample to observations after 2006 increases the light-dark wage gap, indicating a widening of the intraracial gap either in later years or among more experienced workers. Second, in columns 6 to 8, we address possible effects of mixed-race ancestry, defined as an identifiable nonwhite (for whites) or nonblack (for blacks) biological parent. Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and Sanders (2012) find that mixed-race children born to white mothers are advantaged in several academic and labor market outcomes. In column 6, which includes a mixed-race dummy and an interaction with black, the interracial gap in wages increases, particularly for lighter blacks. Excluding black respondents with identifiable mixedrace parentage in column 7 reduces the intraracial advantage for the lightest tercile relative to median black from 0.073 to 0.051; moreover, although still similar in size, the intraracial coefficient on Light is no longer statistically different from 0. Omitting all mixed-race respondents in column 8 yields similar results.
We are reluctant to classify respondents by parent race on two accounts. First, our sample consists of respondents classified by the NLSY as non-Hispanic black or white, which explicitly excludes a small sample of "mixed" individuals. Thus, by our definition here, several mixed respondents were omitted when we restricted our sample to non-Hispanics. Also, since most of our presumed mixed-race respondents here have a Hispanic parent, the mixed classification should All columns include all controls and sample restrictions in column 6 of table 5, the main specification. All color ratings includes 56 respondents with color ratings in 2009 or 2010. Hours/week ≥20 includes wages of respondents working 20+ hours per week. Black ≥ 2 and white ≤ 6 drops outliers in color. Mixed dummy included an indicator = 1 if mixed race (not shown) and an interaction with black (shown). Omit mixed excludes respondents with an identifiable biological parent of a different race. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses; * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
be interpreted with caution. Second, the NLSY was not able to locate both biological parents for all respondents, raising concerns about selection. If respondents for whom both parents can be contacted are advantaged over those for whom they cannot, and having two identifiable parents increases the likelihood of finding mixed parentage, then estimates will be biased. We in fact find that having two identifiable biological parents increases the likelihood of finding a mixed race set for blacks. Omitting presumed mixed-race respondents does not alter our longitudinal results, although for brevity, we do not show all of these robustness checks.
C. Employment
In table 7, we estimate the same set of regressions on the share of weeks employed in the past year. As above, the inclusion of individual characteristics reduces the blackwhite gap by nearly half, from 17% to about 10%, without interviewer controls, comparable to findings in Ritter and Taylor (2011) . Yet we find little evidence of employment differentials across skin color. Moreover, the sequential inclusion of control variables leaves the intraracial employment gap virtually unchanged. We conclude that while interracial differences in employment correspond with black-white differences in wages, the same is not true for differences within race, across skin color. Therefore, a unifying theory explaining skin color differentials will have to be distinct, at least in this dimension, from one that applies to racial differences in labor market outcomes.
D. Longitudinal Analysis
In table 8, we interact skin tone with both potential experience (columns 1-2) and tenure (columns 3-4) to show the evolution of inter-and intraracial wage gaps, as described in equation (6). Both potential experience and tenure are mean centered in all specifications such that level differences in wages correspond to those from our noninteracted models. Interactions between experience and education (HGC, mean centered) and AFQT are also included to address conditional differences in returns to experience by skin color and race. Each model also includes our full set of controls. 17 Results in table 8 indicate that as workers accrue experience, two phenomena occur. First, the wage gap between black and white workers widens as potential experience increases. Second, as workers accrue job-specific tenure, the 10 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Dependent variable is the share of weeks employed 30+ hours in the past interview year (weeks employed/weeks with nonmissing labor force status). Coefficients are marginal effects from a GLM with logit-link specification. Sample is respondents who have entered the labor market with nonmissing HGC and AFQT. Coefficients in panels A and B are relative to white; in panel C, coefficients are relative to medium black. Controls are described in the online appendix. Standard errors are clustered on individuals in parentheses.
composite black-white gap narrows. Yet a blurring of the color line reveals that these results are driven by a divergence in hourly wages within the black population. Column 2 indicates that the entire black-white gap in potential experience is driven by the darkest tercile, for whom the black-white gap widens by approximately 2 percentage points per year of potential experience, while wages for the lighter twothirds of the color distribution remain roughly constant over time. Columns 3 and 4, which combine potential experience and tenure, indicate that the lightest black respondents gain around 4 percentage points on whites with each year of tenure, while the darkest-skinned blacks do not advance significantly relative to whites as tenure accumulates. Intraracial differences in returns to tenure are positive, although in general they are not statistically different from 0. In table 9 we repeat our exercises using a nonparametric specification of skin color for transparency by including dummies for each value of skin tone, with skin tones 1 to 3 and 9 to 10 combined for sufficient sample size. Column 1 reestimates static intraracial gaps, confirming larger average differentials for the darkest two terciles compared with the lightest third. Although blacks with skin colors 1 to 3 have worse labor market outcomes, these outliers account for a small number of observations (47 individuals in total). While some of these exceedingly light ratings may be attributable to albinism, it is statistically unlikely that most of them are. Columns 2 and 3 repeat exercises for potential experience and tenure. In both cases, it is clear that the darkest tercile of blacks earns less as experience accrues compared to their lighter peers.
E. Discussion
Static versions of statistical discrimination models seem at odds with our findings. We uncover little evidence of convergence in wages across skin tone for blacks as labor market experience accrues. In fact, our evidence suggests that both black-white and dark-light wage gaps increase over time. These findings add to the evidence of growth in racial differences in wages across the life course presented by Tomaskovic-Devey and Johnson (2005) , indicating that a widening happens within the African American population as their careers progress and improved wage offers are obtained (or not).
Dynamic models of statistical discrimination provide a better explanation for these findings. Our evidence suggests that experience accumulation may generate smaller gains for darker blacks if they are representative of unproductive job changes. Therefore, if Oettinger's (1996) argument can be extended from white-black to light-dark differences in the quality of prospective job market match signal, the wage differences we uncover within the black population suggest mismatches and job instability. In an additional empirical exercise, not reported here, using the same specification as Dependent variable is log of real hourly wage. Sample is respondents who have entered the labor market with nonmissing HGC and AFQT, and valid wages (30+ hours/week). Panels A and B are relative to whites; panel C coefficients are relative to medium black. Potential experience (potexp) is years since labor market entry; tenure is job specific, rounded to the nearest integer. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. the wage regressions above, we find significant differences between dark and light blacks in the probability of holding a job for one year or more. Combined with our results showing no differentials in employment probabilities, this suggests that the effects of potential experience accrue differentially for lighter-and darker-skinned blacks, representing differential patterns of job mobility. Thus, despite having similar employment likelihoods in a given year, darkerskinned blacks face a higher rate of job switches than lighter blacks, resulting in differential trajectories of wage accumulation. It is important to keep in mind that these effects may be related to time changes in labor market churning associated with a boom-bust pattern of the U.S. business cycle during the time period studied here; thus, we make these claims with caution. More research on the topic is warranted.
VI. Conclusion
We present evidence of the role skin color plays in earnings and employment for African American males based on a novel and representative sample of American youth. By differentiating skin tone within race, we add to a robust literature on racial differentials in labor market outcomes in the tradition of Neal and Johnson (1996) , Ritter and Taylor (2011) , and others. Moreover, by employing a uniform measure of skin tone to estimate skin color differentials in a representative sample and by estimating the evolution of these differentials over time, we add to a nascent literature on the relationship between skin color and earnings building on earlier work by Hersch (2006 Hersch ( , 2008 , Goldsmith and Darity (2007) , and others.
While we find no impact of complexion on employment, we show that measured differences in earnings within race, across skin color cannot be explained away by skills accumulated before labor market entry. In fact, we show that accounting for premarket skill accumulation increases the empirical importance of intraracial differences relative to interracial differentials. In particular, while close to twothirds of racial wage gaps are explained by premarket factors, this is true only for at most one-third of the color gap between light-and medium-skinned African Americans. The color gap in wages not explained by skills brought to the market amounts to 5.4 percentage points (or half the racial gap) based on our most conservative estimates. Additional analyses comparing the evolution of wage profiles as respondents accumulate labor market experience are equally revealing. We find that as black workers accumulate experience, the gap between light-and darker-skinned black respondents widens, while the gap between the lightest-skinned black workers and their white counterparts remains constant.
In addition, we provide a novel description of the distribution of skin tone among black and white American youth and investigate the relationship between skin color ratings and interviewer and respondent characteristics. We find that black NLSY respondents were rated with both lighter skin tones and higher variance by black interviewers than by white interviewers. To account for potential effects from interviewer heterogeneity, we include interviewer fixed effects in our preferred specification, finding little meaningful effect on results.
Our results are subject to limitations. It is important to consider that when examining the accumulation of labor market experience, we observe only early careers (the average age Dependent variable is natural log of real hourly wage. Sample is respondents who have entered the labor market (not enrolled and have at least two semesters out of school), with nonmissing HGC and AFQT, and valid wages (30+ hours/week). Coefficients in panels A and B are relative to white; in panel C, coefficients are relative to medium black. Potential experience (potexp) is number of years since labor market entry; HGC, potential experience, and tenure are centered. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
among respondents is 28 in 2010). Moreover, although our skin color measure is a significant improvement on previous work, it is not entirely objective and cannot be treated as cardinal. We highlight the importance of perception in racial classifications and underscore the inherent subjectivity of racial classifications in both surveys and day-to-day interactions. Finally, we are not in a position to rule out the possibilities that the accumulation of such skills is in itself a response to expected labor market discrimination or that our skill measures are racially or color biased or incomplete in nature. Nonetheless, by presenting evidence on the relevance of skin tone in labor market outcomes beyond traditional dichotomous racial classifications, we challenge the notion of race as black and white as traditionally employed in economics.
